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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Injuries have replaced illness as the major source of 
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death and disability for people aged 1 to 45 in the United 
States (Rice, MacKenzie, & Associates, 1989). About half of 
all deaths in young children result from injuries and each 
year 30,000 children suffer permanent disabilities, 600,000 
children are hospitalized, and almost 16 million children are 
treated in emergency rooms because of injury. For preschool 
children, injuries that occur in the home are responsible for 
the majority of deaths (National Center for Health 
Statistics, 1984; Rodriguez, 1990). Preschool children 
appear to be particularly vulnerable to injury due to their 
developmental limitations in dealing with dangerous 
situations, but little research has focussed on addressing 
the developmental issues involved with physical injury among 
preschoolers. 
Clearly, improving the physical safety of children is a 
social concern which merits scientific attention. 
Unfortunately, the field of injury control is still in its 
infancy. Contributions to the research have primarily been 
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from the public-health field and only recently has the field 
of psychology begun to contribute (Spielberger & Frank, 
1992). Although ample research exists on the types of 
injuries that children sustain (Matheny, 1980), and on the 
development of programs to prevent injuries (e.g. Peterson & 
Mori, 1985), research is limited on how children of different 
ages form cognitive representations of safety rules and how 
possible differences may contribute to safe and unsafe 
behavior. Additional research is necessary to obtain a 
greater understanding of the psychological mechanisms 
involved in unintentional childhood injury. More research 
from a developmental and conceptual perspective may shed 
light on when and how children form concepts of safety and 
learn to follow safety rules. By understanding when and how 
children make sense of safety rules, more appropriate 
intervention strategies could be established. 
Researchers have primarily concentrated on describing 
children's conceptions and descriptions of social-
conventional rules, moral rules, and personal rules. 
Social-conventional rules are those designed to maintain 
social order. Moral rules are those related to intrinsic 
concepts of justice, individual rights, and the welfare of 
others. Personal rules are those related to an 
individual's own preferences and choices and do not 
directly affect others' welfare or disrupt social order 
(Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; 
Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1977; Weston & Turiel, 1980). 
However, it is not clear what are the underlying 
characteristics of safety rules and how these 
characteristics differ from other rule types. 
Additionally, research has attempted to delineate what 
facilitates the understanding of different types of rules. 
It appears that the developmental origins of rule 
conceptualization stems from children's experience with 
qualitatively different types of social interactions. 
Naturalistic studies (Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Nucci & Turiel, 
1978) have shown that both children and adults respond 
differently to violations of moral rules (e.g. stealing) as 
opposed to social-conventional rules (e.g. talking out of 
turn), and that such variable social reactions shape how a 
child learns the differences between types of rules. In 
other words, a child learns to distinguish between 
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different types of rule concepts depending on the different 
kinds of social feedback the child receives. However, it 
is not clear whether or how children learn to distinguish 
safety rules from other types of rules. It is also unknown 
at what age children typically begin to learn safety 
concepts and what facilitates the development of such 
concepts. It is possible that different kinds of social 
interactions or different experiences with actual physical 
injury may facilitate safety rule conceptualization, but 
such research has not been reported. 
Therefore, the purpose of the present study is to 
investigate how safety rules are conceptualized in relation 
to other types of rules for preschool children. The focus 
of the study will be the exploration of safety through a 
cognitive-developmental perspective. In particular, 
differences between moral rules and safety rules will be 
examined. This study will use the conceptual framework and 
methods from the moral reasoning literature (e.g., Turiel, 
1977) which has been used to study the development of 
various rule systems in children. This study will also 
investigate certain experiential factors that may 
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contribute to the development of children's safety rule 
concepts. In particular, assessments of children's 
experience with social interactions and injury history will 
be obtained. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Childhood Injury. 
Historically, conceptualizing childhood injury and injury 
prevention has been through the use of the "host-agent-
environment" model (Grantz, 1979; Rivara & Mueller, 1987). 
The host of an injury is the child; the agent is the injury-
causing stimulus; and the environment 1s the ongoing 
physical, temporal, and interpersonal setting. This model 
has been primarily used from a medical, public-health 
orientation which views the control of injuries in a similar 
fashion to the control of diseases. Because of the limited 
focus on human behavior, it is not surprising that the field 
of psychology has been poorly represented in the area of 
injury control (Spielberger & Frank, 1992). 
Early psychological research viewed injury as 
characteristic of "accident prone" individuals and thus 
focused on identifying individual and demographic 
characteristics of the child/host in an attempt to reduce 
child injury (Roberts, Elkins, & Royal, 1984). Although no 
single accident prone trait has ever been identified, 
differences in certain characteristics have been found to be 
related to injury. For example, boys are identified as more 
at risk for injury than girls (Langley, McGee, Silva, & 
Williams, 1983). Also, age was related to specific type of 
inJury. For example, toddlers are at risk for poisoning; 
preschoolers are at risk for drowning; and elementary school 
children are at risk for pedestrian accidents (Matheny, 
1980) . 
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Such differences are partly due to the developmental 
changes in the child. For instance, toddlers tend to put 
objects in their mouth during this age and would thus be more 
prone to poisoning; preschoolers are more mobile and are 
helpless in the water and would thus be prone to drowning; 
and school-aged children are allowed in the streets by 
themselves and would thus be prone to pedestrian accidents. 
Age differences have particular relevance to understanding 
injury control because of the interaction of the child's 
cognitive level, motor development, behavioral skills, and 
situational access. Identifying personal risk 
characteristics of the host is considered a precursor to 
injury prevention and such identification of high risk 
individuals facilitated subsequent research on intervention 
strategies. 
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Research on injury prevention programs by public-health 
professionals have focused on attempting to eliminate the 
injury agent from the host (similar to how one would attempt 
to remove a virus from a sick child). Common agents of child 
injury are automobile accidents, drownings, burns, falls, 
poisonings, etc. (Grantz, 1979). The host-agent-environment 
model assumes that by eliminating or modifying the hazards 
that cause injury (the agents), fewer injuries will occur. 
This method has been highly successful in reducing 
population-wide childhood injuries (Cataldo, 1991). Examples 
include mandating child-resistant packaging to reduce 
poisoning (Walton, 1982); establishing flammability standards 
for children's sleepwear to reduce burn injuries (Smith & 
Falk, 1987); mandating the use of child restraint seats 1n 
automobiles to reduce deaths from car accidents (Fawcett, 
Seekins, & Jason, 1987); and mandating the installation of 
window guards on all high-rise residential buildings to 
reduce deaths from falls (Spiegel & Lindaman, 1977). All of 
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these efforts have resulted in significant reductions in 
these particular injuries. 
Although a reduction in injuries has been achieved 
through altering the injury agent, it is clearly impossible 
to achieve complete physical separation of the child and 
potentially dangerous agents. As stated by Peterson and Mori 
(1985), "it is currently not possible to design kitchens that 
cannot injure children, houses that do not catch on fire, or 
environments in which threatening strangers never seek 
admission" (p. 593). In addition, there will be instances 
where interventions directed at the environment cannot be 
implemented, as is the case with a latch-key child (Peterson 
& Mori, 1985). Not only are children who are home alone 
likely to encounter potentially injurious situations, but so 
are children in general when they are even momentarily by 
themselves. These considerations indicate that interventions 
directed at changing the child's behavior are warranted. 
Unfortunately, the host-agent-environment model does not 
lend itself to individual interventions because the focus is 
on the child as a passive participant in a dangerous world. 
In addition, characteristics of the child identified as at 
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risk for injury are those which cannot be easily altered, 
such as age, sex, cultural background, etc. It is precisely 
for these reasons why psychological research has been limited 
in the area of injury control. Psychological research tends. 
to be oriented toward behavioral solutions, and psychologists 
are accustomed to thinking in terms of persuading people to 
change behaviors, attitudes, and lifestyles (Williams & Lund, 
1992). Therefore, conceptualizing injury control in terms 
of involving the individual child's behavior would be more 
useful for psychologists. 
A more appropriate framework for categorizing injury 
control for psychological research has been described as the 
target-method-tactics model (Peterson & Mori, 1985; Roberts, 
et al. 1984). This behavioral conceptualization of 
intervention begins by "identifying the target, or focus, of 
intervention; the method for introducing change; and the 
tactics for introducing the change method to the target." 
(Peterson & Mori, 1985, p. 587). 
Potential targets of intervention can be the child, 
parents, or agents of injury. Methods that can be used 
include legislative/mandated (i.e. legal mandates to improve 
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safety, such as passing a law to include air bags in all new 
automobiles), or educational/persuasive (i.e. individual or 
group instruction of safety precautions or skills, such as 
persuading expectant mothers to buy a child restraint seat). 
Tactics through which particular methods can contact targets 
have been called population-wide tactics (i.e. implementing a 
method to an entire community, such as through the mass 
media), milestone tactics (i.e., designing interventions to 
suit a child at a particular developmental level, such as 
teaching school-aged children to cross the street safely), 
and high-risk-group tactics (i.e., approaching individuals 
particularly at risk for injury, such as teaching children in 
California safe reactions to earthquakes). 
This target-method-tactics model to injury prevention is 
more appropriate for psychological research because it 
incorporates the host-agent-environment model and also 
acknowledges that interventions can focus on altering the 
child's behavior through methods that can be used directly 
with children (e.g., educational methods). It also makes use 
of tactics which can focus more directly on the specific 
problem at hand. Instead of only focussing on one aspect of 
childhood injury (i.e., changing the dangerous agent), 
applying a combination of approaches can be more useful in 
designing specific successful interventions. 
12 
An overview of injury prevention programs indicates that 
the most successful interventions for reducing actual number 
of injuries sustained have involved targeting the injury 
agent (e.g., automobiles) using legislative methods through 
population-wide tactics (e.g., mandating use of child car 
seats), as mentioned earlier in this paper (Fawcett, 
Seekins, & Jason, 1987; Smith & Falk, 1987; Spiegel & 
Lindaman, 1977; Walton, 1982). Interventions targeting 
parents using educational methods through population-wide 
tactics have also shown some success (Christophersen, 
Sosland-Edelman, & Leclaire, 1985; Kanthor, 1976; Treiber, 
1986). 
Interventions targeting the child using educational 
methods through high-risk-group tactics have shown some 
success. For example, behavioral programs utilizing intense 
training through modeling and rehearsals (i.e., educational 
methods) have successfully taught safe reactions to fires 
(Jones, Kazdin, & Haney, 1981), have taught home safety 
skills to latch-key children (Peterson & Mori, 1985), and 
have increased children's correct recognition and reporting 
of emergencies (Rosenbaum, Creedon, & Drabman, 1981). 
Interventions targeting the child using educational 
methods through milestone tactics have also shown some 
success. For example, interventions have altered preschool 
children's unsafe responses to a potential child molester 
(Poche, Brouwer, & Swearingen, 1981), and have trained 
pedestrian safety skills to school-aged children (Yeaton & 
Bailey, 1978). 
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Limitations to the above-mentioned studies still remain 
and thus further research is warranted. For example, in the 
educational interventions with parents or with children, 
improvements in safety behavior was reported, but actual 
decreases in the frequency of injuries have not been obtained 
(Peterson & Mori, 1985). In addition, children learned the 
specific safe behaviors they were taught but could not 
generalize to other types of dangerous behaviors. It is 
impossible to teach a child to respond safely in every 
potentially dangerous encounter. Therefore, it is clear that 
more research needs to be conducted on why these problems 
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exist and how to approach them. 
One approach would be to gain a better understanding of 
how children's conceptual and developmental limitations 
contribute to resulting injuries. This could be done by 
utilizing interventions strategies which target the child and 
use educational methods through milestone tactics. However, 
little is known on how children in different developmental 
stages conceptualize issues of safety. Knowing the child's 
age is not enough to guarantee a successful intervention. It 
is also necessary to gain an understanding of how children of 
different ages organize concepts of safety and how they 
incorporate the safety rules they are taught into their 
general way of responding to their environment. 
Before one can begin teaching safety strategies to 
children, it is important to first know the mental processes 
that children go through when learning safety rules, what 
contributes to the learning of safety rules (i.e., what are 
the developmental origins of safety concepts), and if 
children of very young ages are even capable of understanding 
safety rules. By obtaining an understanding of these issues, 
one can hope to teach children to lead a safer lifestyle. If 
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children were able to internalize safety rules, then they 
would be more likely to act safely in many different types of 
dangerous situations, instead of only the particular 
situation in which they were taught. 
Ample research exists on the types of injuries that 
children sustain, and on the development of programs to 
prevent injuries, but research is lacking on how children's 
cognitive representations of safety rules contribute to safe 
and unsafe behavior. A possible direction of investigation 
would include approaching injury control from a cognitive-
developmental perspective as other authors have suggested 
(Coppens, 1985; Garbarino, 1988; Jones & Haney, 1989; 
Kendall, 1981; Mori & Peterson, 1986; Peterson & Mori, 1985). 
Evidence has clearly demonstrated (Garbarino, 1988; 
Rivara, 1982; Roberts, Elkins, & Royal, 1984) that children 
of different ages have different experiences with injury, and 
it follows that they may conceptualize safety behaviors 
differently. Such safety behaviors are governed by 
principles or rules that the child has acquired. Currently, 
there is limited literature which attempts to explain how 
children conceptualize and learn safety rules. 
It is possible that children of different ages 
conceptualize and learn safety rules in different ways and 
this may contribute to the selective frequency of injuries 
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that children sustain A younger child may be more prone to 
injury given their limited cognitive understanding of their 
environment and their still-developing motor skills. On the 
other hand, an older child will have a more developed 
cognitive understanding of their environment and more 
experience interacting with the world around them, and this 
may enhance the child's ability to judge the consequences of 
his or her actions. Another developmental factor is that 
children of different ages also have differential experience 
with authority figures who teach and enforce the safety rules 
and this can potentially affect how they act in unsafe 
situations. For example, younger children may be less likely 
than older children to challenge or ignore an authority 
figure's prescribed safety rules. However, empirical studies 
on these issues are lacking. 
The present study proposes to investigate children's 
understanding of safety rules from a cognitive-developmental 
perspective. Specifically, this study will examine if 
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children as young as 2 1/2 years old see safety rules as 
distinctive compared to other types of rules (i.e., moral 
rules), what characteristics of safety rules are most salient 
in the child's mind (i.e., the harmful consequences, the 
punishment received for breaking safety rules, etc.), and 
what types of experiences in early childhood lead to the 
acquisition and retention of safety rules and safety concepts 
(i.e., social interactions vs. experiences with physical 
injury). This study will use the conceptual framework and 
methods from the moral reasoning literature (e.g., Turiel, 
1977) which has been used to study the development of various 
rule systems in children. A review of this literature will 
be presented as a context for how children generally 
conceptualize various types of rules. 
Children's Conceptions of Rules 
Theoretical considerations on the development of 
children's conceptualization of rules were pioneered by 
Piaget (1932/1965). He proposed that children have a unitary 
concept of rules (i.e., all rules are thought of as the same) 
and that children develop from viewing rules as fixed to 
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viewing them as alterable. He did not believe that children 
could differentiate between different types of rules. In 
addition, rule-following behavior was believed to be the 
basis behind moral development. He made generalizations from 
concepts of game rules to concepts of moral rules in his 
description of the development of morality and formulated a 
theory that included a premoral period and two moral stages. 
Piaget concluded that preschool children were in a 
premoral stage and thus had little awareness of rules. It 
was not until the child became older that he or she developed 
from viewing all rules as unalterable to viewing them as 
alterable. He asserted that by ages 4 to 5, the child became 
more aware of rules by watching older children and imitating 
their behavior. He speculated that children begin to learn 
rules by their experiences in their environment. Between the 
ages of 6 and 10, the child enters the stage of heteronomous 
morality and was thought to view all rules as absolutes and 
unalterable. By age 10 or 11, Piaget asserted that children 
begin to enter the stage of autonomous morality. It is not 
until this stage that he believed children were able to view 
rules as arbitrary and alterable. Finally, Piaget concluded 
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that the transition in moral stages takes place through both 
cognitive maturation and social experience. In particular, 
when children begin school and interact more with peers, they 
soon learn to compromise and make rules when playing 
together. They also learn that rules are social agreements 
that are arbitrary and alterable, instead of obligatory 
statements made by authority figures which are viewed as 
sacred and unalterable (Piaget, 1932/1965). 
Piaget did not make distinctions between potentially 
different types of rules (i.e., game rules, safety rules, 
moral rules) that the child may be able to recognize. Piaget 
believed that children conceptualize rules as unitary 
concepts and do not differentiate game rules from potentially 
other types of social rules. If Piaget's findings are 
accurate, one would not expect preschool children to make 
distinctions between safety rules and other types of rules 
because they are supposed to be in the premoral stage until 
they are 6 years old. 
Contrary to Piaget's theories, recent research has 
indicated that very young children have the ability to 
distinguish between clearly different conceptual domains 
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regarding rules, and do not have a unitary concept of rules. 
Clear evidence has demonstrated that children can 
conceptualize social rules into at least three conceptually 
distinct domains: moral, societal, and psychological domains 
(Turiel,1977; 1983). 
Turiel (1977) pioneered the research which described 
these domains. He reported compelling evidence that children 
as young as 6 years old make clear differentiations between 
two types of social rules: social-conventional rules and 
moral rules. Social-conventional rules serve to maintain 
order in a particular social system. Examples of social 
conventions include modes of addressing a teacher, modes of 
dress, gender associated jobs, modes of eating, etc. Turiel 
(1977) found that the most salient characteristic of these 
rules was that they all related to concepts of social 
organization. These rules were also seen as arbitrary in 
that alternative actions for a given situation could just as 
easily be applied. For example, wearing a green uniform to 
school is simply a convention because one could have easily 
designated wearing a blue uniform as the proper act. 
Conventions were also viewed as easily alterable since there 
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is no intrinsic prescriptive basis to them, rather, they are 
determined by consensus (Turiel, 1977). 
Research describing the characteristics of moral rules 
identify them as pertaining to the individual rights of 
people and concepts of justice (Damon, 1975; Kohlberg, 1976; 
Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1977). Specifically, moral 
rules are those which stem from factors intrinsic to the 
actions themselves. Issues such as taking a life, physical 
or psychological harm to others, honesty, trust, violation of 
rights, responsibility, etc. are moral in and of themselves, 
and they relate to justice. In contrast to conventional 
acts, moral acts are neither arbitrary nor relative to the 
social context (Davidson, Turiel, & Black, 1983; Shweder, 
Turiel, & Much, 1981; Turiel, 1977, 1983). 
Research investigating preschool children's 
conceptualization of conventional acts and moral acts have 
found similar results. Nucci and Turiel (1978) questioned 
preschool children in a naturalistic setting about 
spontaneously occurring moral and conventional acts that the 
children had observed. The authors used "justification 
categories" to empirically define the content of each domain. 
The authors obtained this assessment by asking participants 
to give reasons to why a particular act was wrong. As 
expected, the children classified moral acts as those 
relating to justice, welfare/injury to the victim, personal 
loss, or violation of personal rights. Conventional acts 
were classified as those relating to aspects of social 
organization or maintaining social order (Nucci & Turiel, 
1978). 
Nucci and Turiel (1978) also used what is known as 
"criterion judgements" as another assessment to distinguish 
between rule types. An example of one criterion they 
measured was "rule contingency" which involved asking 
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participants to judge whether a certain act would be okay to 
do if there were no rule prohibiting said act. They found 
that 81% said yes when asked about conventions, but only 14% 
said yes when asked about moral acts. Thus, moral rules were 
seen as universal, or context-independent, while social-
conventional rules were arbitrary or context-dependent. This 
was another indication that children were capable of clearly 
differentiating two types of social rules, each with its 
specific defining characteristics. 
23 
Assessment strategies utilizing verbal reports of 
preschool children showed the same results. Smetana (1981a) 
examined children from the ages of 2 1/2 to 4 years to 
investigate whether children this young conceptualized rules 
as either moral or social- conventional. She assessed this 
by asking participants to make the criterion judgements 
regarding "rule contingency", "rule relativism" (or whether a 
rule is generalizable to all contexts), "seriousness of 
transgression", and "amount of deserved punishment" for 10 
stories depicting moral or conventional preschool 
transgressions. Results showed that children of this very 
young age could make distinctions among the domains. In 
contrast to social-conventional transgressions, they judged 
moral transgressions as more serious, deserving of more 
punishment, generalizable across situations, and not 
contingent on the explicit presence of a rule. In another 
study (Smetana, 1985), it was found that preschool children 
could distinguish between moral and conventional domains by 
identifying that moral stories pertained to acts involving 
other's welfare, while conventional stories pertained to acts 
involving social order. 
Research found similar results when interviewing 
strategies and verbal reports were used with an older 
population of children to specify characteristics of the 
different domains. Weston and Turiel (1980) presented 5 to 
11 year old children with stories in which children were 
allowed to hit {moral act) and stories where children were 
allowed to undress in the playground {conventional act). 
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They found that a majority of participants judged that it was 
wrong for a school to allow hitting and wrong for students to 
follow that rule. However, the majority of participants 
judged it acceptable to permit undressing and acceptable for 
students to follow that rule. Hence, they found that 
children's evaluations of a certain type of social rule were 
based on their judgements about the related act. If they 
judged an act to be a social convention, then they judged the 
rule as arbitrary. 
The use of naturalistic observations of children in the 
playground elaborated previous findings about the specific 
characteristics which empirically defined each domain. A 
study by Nucci and Nucci (1982) observed children from the 
2nd, 5th, and 7th grades and documented a total of 439 moral 
25 
events and 1,045 social conventional events. They 
subsequently interviewed children who had observed these 
events and asked them to classify the acts. For moral 
events, the children's responses revolved around the 
intrinsic (hurtful or unjust) consequences of the actions, 
while responses to conventional events centered on aspects of 
the social order. Thus, studies from both laboratory 
settings and naturalistic situations provide evidence that 
children from toddlerhood, to middle childhood and early 
adolescence distinguish between two types of rules: moral 
and social-conventional. 
The robustness of empirical evidence delineating the 
existence of different conceptual domains for rules, each 
with their own set of defining characteristics, has been 
demonstrated with children of different ages and from 
different cultures. For example, conceptual domain 
differences have been obtained in non-Western societies. 
Korean children (Park & Johnson, 1984; Song, Smetana, & Kim, 
1987), children and adolescents in Nigerian communities 
(Hallos & Turiel, 1986), and children in the Virgin Islands 
(Nucci, Turiel, & Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983) were found to 
develop moral and social conventional conceptualizations of 
the their social world. 
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Ample research has been described on the distinctions 
between the moral and social-conventional domains. Children 
also conceptualize a third domain that is distinct from moral 
and social-conventional, namely, the psychological domain 
(Broughton, 1978; Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981b; 1989a). Nucci 
(1981) found that one aspect of the psychological domain is 
that children conceptualize the existence of personal rules. 
These are perceived to be primarily of consequence to the 
actor rather that on other people (moral) or societal order 
(conventional). They are essentially nonsocial in nature and 
thus do not involve issues of justice or social order. He 
found that certain actions were classified as not affecting 
others, they were one's own business, and they should not be 
governed by rules. Examples of these acts were choosing 
friends, decisions about personal appearance, deciding to 
join an activity, choosing the content of creative works, 
etc. These actions all defined some private aspect of an 
individual's life where the issue of "right or wrong" was one 
of preference rather than obligation or custom (Nucci, 1981). 
In contrast to moral and social conventional rules, rules 
governing personal acts were judged to be inordinate or 
absurd by the younger participants (age 7), and the oldest 
participants (up to age 20) rated these rules as unjust. 
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Thus, in contrast to Piaget's predictions, ample research 
(Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Nucci & Turiel, 1976; 
Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1977; Smetana, 1989; Weston & Turiel, 
1980) has found that children do not possess a unitary 
concept of rules; rather, children define a type of rule 
depending on the meaning that they attribute to the rule 
(i.e., whether it pertains to justice, social organization, 
or personal factors). Children do not move from viewing all 
rules as fixed to viewing them alterable, as Piaget 
suggested. Moral rules are viewed as unalterable from the 
beginning, and social-conventional rules are viewed as 
alterable from the beginning. Children as young as two and a 
half years old have a clear awareness of rules and can 
differentiate between moral and social conventional rules. 
These children do not seem to be in a premoral stage, as 
Piaget theorized. Finally, individuals from 7 to 20 years 
old also differentiate personal rules as a separate category 
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from moral and social conventional rules. 
Given that it has been found that young children make 
clear distinctions between different types of rules, it would 
not be unreasonable to investigate whether safety rules are 
viewed as different from the above mentioned types of rules, 
and if so, what are the characteristics that set safety rules 
apart from the others. Do children organize their concepts 
of safety into a separate domain? Do children view 
violations of safety rules as serious and deserving of 
punishment? Do they view safety rules as generalizable, 
mandatory, unjust, one's own business, or necessary to 
maintain order? The following section will review the 
limited research on safety rules. 
Children's Conceptions of Safety Rules 
Very limited research has been conducted on children's 
conceptualization of safety rules using the same cognitive 
developmental framework described previously. Nucci, Guerra, 
& Lee (1991) compared adolescents' criterion judgments of 
personal, prudential (safety), and social conventional 
concepts regarding the harmful effects of drug use. They 
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found that adolescents did distinguish among the different 
domains, indicating that they perceived a separate domain for 
safety rules. For example, they found that the majority of 
participants.categorized the use of drugs as a personal or 
prudential matter rather than a moral or social-conventional 
matter. 
Research with school-aged children has revealed that this 
age group also categorize distinct characteristics of safety 
rules. Tisak & Turiel (1984) investigated whether 6 to 10 
year old children could distinguish between the social-
interactional, moral aspects of harm and the nonsocial, 
prudential (safety) aspects of harm. In other words, 
violations of moral rules not only cause physical injury, but 
also have an effect on social interactions. Violations of 
safety rules only involve physical injury to oneself and do 
not involve hurting of other people. They presented 
participants with three stories where the transgressions of 
rules resulted in either physical injury or no physical 
injury. Results indicated that the children saw both moral 
and safety rules as important, their violation as wrong, 
their validity as noncontingent on authority, and as 
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generalizable. However, the judgments were more extreme for 
the moral rules than for the safety rules, and the moral 
rules were judged as more important. The primary 
distinguishing characteristic of the rules was that for moral 
rules, children focussed on both the consequences of the act 
and on the regulation of social relations, while their 
justifications for the safety rule were based only on the 
consequences of harm. Safety rules were perceived as 
nonsocial in nature and as less important than moral rules, 
regardless of the fact that both resulted in harmful 
consequences to the actor. It is also important to note that 
fewer younger children distinguished between the two rule 
types, but a clear discussion on why this might be the case 
was not given, leaving open the empirical question of whether 
younger children actually distinguish between the two 
domains. In addition, children's judgments on safety rule 
violations which did not result in physical injury was not 
investigated. 
So far, this literature review has focused on describing 
the empirical evidence in support of the notion that children 
conceptualize rules into distinct domains: moral, social-
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conventional, psychological, and prudential. Research on the 
first three domains has indicated that children as young as 2 
1/2 years old can identify rules pertaining to different 
domains. However, research on the prudential domain has only 
looked at children from age 6 and older. The present study 
will elaborate on the previous studies by testing children 
from ages 2 1/2 to 5 1/2 years old to determine if this age 
group of children can also make distinctions between safety 
rules and other types of rules (e.g., moral rules). 
In addition, how children develop the concept of safety 
rules has not been studied. This will be a second focus of 
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the present study: investigating possible origins of safety 
rule concept formation. Although research is lacking in this 
area, ample research exists on how children develop moral and 
social-conventional concepts, and some research exists on how 
children develop psychological or personal concepts. The 
following section will review this literature. 
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Developmental Origins of Moral, Social-Conventional, and 
Personal Rules 
Research on the development of the moral, social 
conventional and psychological domains has been conducted. 
It has been hypothesized that each domain develops out of 
qualitatively different interactions with the environment and 
people (Turiel, 1977, 1983). Although each domain may be 
coordinated in judgments about a single event or may be 
related in the sense that one domain provides information 
that may stimulate development in a different domain 
(Smetana, 1983; Turiel & Smetana, 1984), each domain is 
viewed as a distinct and independent conceptual system. As 
such, research has delineated the process of development 
within each domain. 
For example, research on the development of concepts of 
justice or morality (Damon, 1975, 1980; Kohlberg, 1976; 
Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971), of social convention (Turiel, 1975, 
1977), and of personal or psychological concepts (Broughton, 
1978) demonstrates how each follows a distinct sequential 
course of development. Further, each sequence has a unique 
origin and endpoint in development, and each appears to 
develop out of different types of social interactions. 
Qualitatively distinct types of social interactions with 
different classes of events or reactions lead to the 
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construction of different types of social and conceptual 
knowledge (Ast, Cicchetti, & Rabideau, 1989; Much & Shweder, 
1978; Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; 
Sanderson & Siegal, 1988; Smetana, 1983; Smetana, Kelly, & 
Twentyman, 1984). 
Moral judgments arise from children's experience with 
events or actions that affect their own and other's rights or 
welfare. Children who observe or are victims of pain or 
perceived injustice generate prescriptions regarding such 
events and realize that the act is wrong with or without a 
rule prohibiting such act (e.g., Smetana, 1983). These 
concepts have been empirically tested through research on 
naturally occurring transgressions among toddlers (Smetana, 
1984, 1989b), preschool children (Nucci & Turiel, 1978), and 
school-age (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b) children. 
Social-conventional knowledge is developed through an 
increased understanding of the prohibitions regarding acts 
rather than from experience with the acts themselves (Weston 
& Turiel, 1980). Toddlers and preschool children do not 
readily respond to naturally occurring violations in social 
conventions (Nucci & Turiel, 1978), nor to violations of 
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school regulations (Much & Shweder, 1978). However, they do 
show an understanding of such events because they evaluate 
them differently than moral events (Smetana, 1981a; Smetana, 
Kelly, & Twe~tyman, 1984). With increasing age, children 
begin to initiate responses to conventional transgressions 
(Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b). 
Concepts in the psychological domain, such as inferences 
about other's thoughts, intentions, feelings, and knowledge 
of personality, self, identity, and personal rules, appear to 
develop through a person's attempts to understand others and 
represent internal, psychological processes that are not 
directly given or observable in social interaction. This 
form of knowledge does not arise from the effects of actions 
on others, but through repeated social interactions and 
social experience with people (Broughton, 1978; Nucci, 1981; 
Smetana, 1983; Turiel, 1977). 
Therefore, moral judgments arise from social interactions 
involving the intrinsic characteristics of actions, such as 
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their consequences for the rights and welfare of others. The 
interpretation of social-conventional and psychological 
events is not given in the intrinsic nature of the events 
themselves, but is given in the social system or constructed 
from social interaction. While all judgments have their 
origins in children's experience with social relation events, 
judgments are not located in the events themselves but are 
actively constructed. Children agree in their classification 
of events and actions as content for the domains to the 
extent that they interpret the events or social interactions 
in similar ways (Smetana, 1983). 
Although the literature describes possible origins of the 
moral, social conventional, and psychological domains, no 
research has described the origins of the prudential domain 
and what leads to the conceptualization of safety acts. Does 
different experience with social interactions lead to 
concepts of safety, or do children learn safety rules through 
their experiences with physical injury? Answers to this 
question have not been studied. It is therefore necessary to 
investigate how very young children form concepts of safety. 
In sununary, the purpose of the present study will first 
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be to investigate how safety rules are conceptualized in 
relation to other types of rules for preschool children. In 
particular, differences between moral rules and safety rules 
will be ascertained. This study will also investigate 
certain experiential factors that may contribute to the 
development of children's safety rule concepts. In 
particular, assessments of children's experience with social 
interactions and injury history will be obtained. 
CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
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Research on how children conceptualize safety rules has 
been limited. Although it has been shown that children from 
ages 6 to 10 years old (Tisak & Turiel, 1984) and adolescents 
(Nucci, Guerra, & Lee, 1991) can differentiate safety rules 
from other types of rules, no research exists on whether 
younger children can make such distinctions. Preschool 
children were able to differentiate moral rules from social-
conventional rules (Smetana, 1981a), but it is not known 
whether preschool children can differentiate between safety 
rules and moral rules. 
In addition, research has looked at the developmental 
origins of the concepts of morality, social-conventional 
knowledge, and personal concepts. However, no research has 
been done on the origins of a child's concepts of safety. 
Research investigating possible origins of the concepts of 
safety and on discovering if preschoolers conceptualize 
safety rules in a different domain from moral rules would 
enhance knowledge which could be utilized in developing 
programs to teach children to live a safer lifestyle. 
Prior to designing intervention programs to address 
safety behaviors, research is needed for understanding how 
children cognitively form the concept of safety. An 
educational method of teaching safety to children would be 
limited if one does not first know if the child is 
cognitively capable of grasping the concepts being taught. 
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In addition, if one is to use a developmental milestone 
tactic (Peterson & Mori, 1985), one first needs to understand 
developmental principles of children of particular ages. If 
one understands the world from the child's perspective, then 
intervention programs which are designed to match the 
developmental level of the child would be more likely to be 
effective in guiding safety behavior and generalizing to 
additional situations. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is two-fold. The 
first goal is to determine if preschool children distinguish 
between moral and safety concepts based on the criteria used 
in other studies. Specifically, this study will investigate 
if the younger preschool children in the study will have more 
difficulty than the older preschool children distinguishing 
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the two types of rules. In addition, this study will 
investigate whether children's judgments are affected by the 
type of consequences that result from rule violations. 
The second goal of this study will be to investigate 
whether amount of social experience is related to children's 
evaluation of moral and safety rule violations. 
Specifically, the relationship between the amount of day care 
experience of a child and the degree of importance placed on 
moral rules will be assessed. In a study looking at the 
effects of amount of day care experience of preschool 
children on social interaction, Schindler, Moely, and Frank 
(1987) found that day care experience was related to 
increased social participation. Another study found that 
participants with more hours and months of day care engaged 
in more cooperative play and peer interaction (Field et al., 
1988). Therefore, children with more day care experience may 
have more developed concepts of morality given their 
additional experience with social relations. 
In addition, the relationship between injury history and 
children's concepts of safety will be measured by obtaining 
information from the parents on the frequency of injuries 
40 
their children have sustained, and on their children's injury 
related behavior. The parents will complete an injury 
history questionnaire and the Injury Behavior Checklist to 
assess if an increased frequency of injuries or injury 
related behavior are related to more developed concepts of 
safety. 
It is possible that children who have not entered school, 
or who have had less social experience may perceive moral and 
safety rules differently from children with more social 
experience. Very young children may tend to have more 
experiences with safety rules they learned from their parents 
because a child's primary activities involve the exploration 
of the physical environment and this increases the likelihood 
of injury. In the study by Tisak & Turiel (1984), school-
aged children were able to articulate how both moral and 
safety rules were similar with regard to potential physical 
injury resulting from the violation of the rule. In 
addition, these children can recognize that moral rules are 
social in nature, while safety rules are not. However, it is 
still unclear how preschool children might judge moral rules 
as compared to safety rules. 
It is likely that safety rules are the first type of 
rules that children learn through their exploration of the 
environment, natural consequences, and social consequences. 
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It is possible that as soon as an infant is mobile, he or she 
starts to learn about safety through consequences he or she 
encounters and through consequences imposed on by the parent 
for breaking safety rules. It is clear that the first role 
of the parent is to ensure the safety of their children 
before attempts are made to teach them to get along with 
their peers or to learn social conventions. Therefore, very 
young children may view safety rules as more important than 
moral rules. 
The present paper proposes to utilize methods derived 
from previous studies to determine if preschoolers can 
differentiate safety and moral rules. This will be done 
using the following criterion judgements: seriousness of 
transgression, rule contingency, rule relativity, evaluation 
of deserved punishment, and negation of rule by authority. 
Each of these are explained in further detail in the methods 
section. 
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Smetana (1981a) found test-retest reliability in using 
similar criterion judgements for differentiating moral and 
social-conventional rules in 2 to 4 year-olds. In addition, 
Tisak and Turiel (1984) found reliability in their measures 
of differentiating moral rules from prudential rules in 6 to 
10 year-olds. Therefore, it is assumed that the measures 
utilized in the present study will also be reliable because 
of the similarity in the types of measures used. 
Nevertheless, the measures utilized in this study are 
different because they incorporate negative and neutral 
outcomes for each story. Therefore, test-retest reliability 
was assessed for the measures used. 
Participants were divided into four age groups of preschool 
children (3, 4, 5, and 6 year-olds). These age groups were 
selected partly because Piaget separated children younger than 
4 into the premoral stage and 4 to 6 year-olds into the 
heteromonous stage. Also, Tisak and Turiel (1984) found moral 
vs. prudential differences in children older than 5 1/2 years-
old. In addition, Smetana (1981a) demonstrated that children 
as young as 2 1/2 could reliably be interviewed regarding their 
conceptions of rules using similar methodology. 
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The present study tested five hypotheses. First, it was 
hypothesized that moral rules would be distinguished from 
safety rules throughout the participants tested. Smetana 
(1981a) and Smetana (1985) found that preschool children were 
capable of distinguishing different types of rules and did 
not see all rules as the same. In addition, ample research 
demonstrates that children can distinguish different domains 
of rules and this study is expected to replicate such 
findings. 
Second, it was hypothesized that differences in 
children's judgments of moral and safety rules would be less 
pronounced in younger children. In other words, the younger 
preschool children in the study were expected to 
differentiate less between safety and moral rules compared to 
older children. Tisak & Turiel (1984) found age trends (i.e. 
the younger the child, the less differentiation between moral 
and safety rules). This age trend was expected to continue 
in the present sample. It was speculated that the two types 
of rules might be judged as equally important by the youngest 
children. A large part of very young children's 
socialization is focussed on safety and avoiding injury. It 
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is likely that the first goals of early socialization is to 
keep the child safe, which continues to be a goal until the 
child can regulate himself or herself. Moral socialization 
occurs to prepare the child for social situations and to get 
along with other children. It is therefore possible that 
moral and safety rules may be seen as equally important by 
very young children. It is also possible that the youngest 
children in the sample might judge safety rules as more 
important than moral rules because safety issues may be more 
salient in the young child's mind since this may be what 
parents have emphasized in their socialization goals. 
A third hypothesis was that transgressions of both moral 
and safety rules that result in negative outcomes would be 
judged more harshly than transgressions with no negative 
outcome. Preschool children's judgments about an event are 
to some degree dependent on the consequences of the event 
(Nelson, 1980; Piaget 1932/1965). Children use the resulting 
consequences of a transgression as one of the basis for 
judging rule breaking behavior. The more damage that 
results, the more harshly the behavior of breaking the rule 
is judged. However, this may only occur with regard to moral 
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rules because safety rule violations that result in injury 
may be viewed as already punished. Therefore, children may 
not judge safety rule violations resulting in injury as 
deserving of punishment. In the present study, rule items 
used to measure the criterion judgments will depict 
consequences which result in physical harm and those which do 
not result in physical injury to victims in the stories 
presented to participants. 
A fourth hypothesis was that individual differences in 
day care experience (i.e., amount of social interaction) 
would be correlated with children's judgments of moral rules. 
Children who have had more daycare experience may view moral 
rules as more important and as deserving more punishment. In 
addition, number of siblings may also influence children's 
judgments of moral rules because having siblings may increase 
the opportunity for social interaction. 
Finally, the fifth hypothesis was that individual 
differences in the number of injuries a child has experienced 
and/or injury behavior frequency will be correlated with more 
extreme safety rule judgments. However, the direction of the 
difference could not be predicted from existing literature. 
Whereas the frequency of injuries may sensitize children to 
safety situations, it is also known that dangerous behavior 
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(at least in adults), especially when followed by no injury, 
may lead to judgments of dangerous situations as being less 
dangerous (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993). 
Participants 
CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
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Participants were 120 preschool children attending 
nursery schools and day care centers from two cities in the 
Midwest. Participants were categorized into four age groups 
with 30 participants (15 male and 15 female) in each group. 
Specific ages per group were as follows: Two years, eight 
months (2-8) to 3-4 (M = 3-0), 3-8 to 4-4 (M = 3-11), 4-8 
to 5-4 (M = 5-1), and 5-8 to 6-4 (M = 5-11). The 3 month 
separation between groups was intentional to assure 
appropriate group differentiation. Participants were 
primarily middle-class and Caucasian (94.5%). Participants 
were recruited via parental consent forms which were 
distributed with permission from school officials. Also, 
children were asked if they wished to participate in the 
study. Only willing children proceeded to the experimental 
session. Participant recruitment and experimental procedures 
conformed to APA research guidelines and were approved by the 
Oklahoma State University Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
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The approval form is included at the end of the thesis. 
To obtain the 120 participants in the desired age groups, 
approximately 635 recruitment letters were distributed in 15 
different preschools. A total of 222 consent forms were 
returned. Of these, 84 children did not participate in the 
study because they were either too old, too young, fell 
between age groups, or were not interviewed because the 
desired number of children in their age group had already 
been obtained. In addition, 3 children did not want to 
participate, 4 of the children's parental questionnaires were 
incomplete, 2 children left day care before they could be 
interviewed, 6 protocols were deemed invalid because the 
children did not complete the entire experimental session 
(they were either picked up by their parents in the middle of 
the session, were very shy and stopped answering questions, 
walked away to play with something else, or could not 
communicate well in English), and 2 completed protocols were 
considered invalid because the children never quite 
understood the measures and could not pay attention to the 
stories without considerable re-direction. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were twenty-four 8 1/2 X 5 1/2 monochrome ink 
drawings on poster board illustrated by an artist. They 
depicted four stories (3 pictures each) of common moral 
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transgressions and four stories of common safety transgressions 
(Smetana, 1981; Tisak & Turiel, 1984). Two of the stories from 
each domain depicted a resulting physical injury, while the 
other two stories did not. The gender of the actors were 
consistent with the gender of the participant and the 
characters in the stories were given a male or female name 
depending on the gender of the participant. Figure 1 presents 
an example the stimulus drawings used to depict a safety rule 
transgression (See Figure 1 on page 50). 
The four moral transgression stimuli included drawings and 
a story line depicting: (1) a child pushing another child, 
causing a cut on his or her knee, (2) a child throwing a rock 
at another child, causing a minor scalp injury, (3) a child 
taking another child's snack away during snack time, causing no 
physical harm (the snack owner had finished eating), and (4) a 
child spraying water on another child, causing no physical harm 
(the child was wearing a bathing suit for swimming pool play). 
Figure 1. Stimulus drawings for safety rule violation of 
touching the stove. The child was presented with the 
drawings and told: "In this school there is a kitchen. 
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There is a rule that says 'Don't touch the stove.' But Jenny 
broke the rule and turned on the stove. She turned it off 
and went back to the classroom." 
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The four safety transgression stimuli included drawings and 
a story line depicting: (1) a child running in the rain, 
falling, and causing a cut on his or her knee, (2) a child 
approaching a swing set and getting hit on the head by another 
child's swing, causing a small cut on the head, (3) a child 
breaking a safety rule by climbing a workman's ladder, causing 
no physical injury (even though the child jumped off a high 
rung), and (4) a child exploring the control knobs of a stove 
in the day care kitchen, causing the flames to go on, but 
resulting in no physical injury (flames were turned off). 
Each story was described using the following format: (1) 
State the rule: "In this school there is a rule that says 
'no What is the rule?" (child answers). ( 2) 
Describe rule breaking behavior: "But, Julie (or other 
common name consistent with the gender of the child) breaks 
the rule. She _____ ." (3) State the consequence of 
breaking the rule: "Julie slipped 1n a puddle and gets a cut 
on her knee." (See Appendix A for the stories presented to 
the participants). 
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Measures 
Five types of assessment criteria, derived from previous 
studies (Nucci, 1981; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981; 
Tisak & Turiel, 1984; Turiel, 1977) were used in the present 
study. Figure 2 presents the scales used to measure each 
dependent variable (See Figure 2 on page 55). Each of the 
following was assessed: 
a) Seriousness of Transgression, or how wrong the child 
believes it is to break a particular rule. The degree of 
wrongness they attribute to the violation of the rule is 
considered an index of how important they view the rule to 
be. Participants were asked "Do you think it was bad to 
? (stating what act violated the rule) How bad was it?" 
Positive responses were measured using a four-point scale 
drawing depicting four circular faces of increasing size and 
with progressively larger and more exaggerated frowns. Each 
face was verbally labelled to indicate that the transgression 
was either "okay" (smallest face), "a little bit bad," "very 
bad," or "very, very bad" (largest face). The children were 
asked to point to the face that told how bad the 
transgression was. A value of 1 (smallest face) through 4 
(largest face) was assigned depending on which face was 
selected (Smetana, 1981). 
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b) Rule Contingency, or whether an act is viewed as wrong 
contingent on the rule. In other words, an act may be viewed 
as wrong even though there may not be a rule prohibiting that 
act. An example would be saying the act of hitting is wrong 
even though there may be a rule that permits hitting. This 
was measured by asking the child, "What if there were no 
rule, would it be OK to ___ (the transgression)?" "Yes" 
responses were assigned a value of 1, and "no" responses were 
assigned a O value. Children were shown a line drawing of a 
hand with a "thumbs up" sign to indicate "yes" and a "thumbs 
down" to indicate "no". 
c) Rule Relativity/Generalizability, or whether the rule 
is relative to the child's particular setting and not 
generalizable to other contexts, or vice versa. That is, a 
child may see a rule as okay to use in school, but not okay 
to use at home or in another school. To measure this, the 
child was asked, "Would it be okay to __ (the transgression) 
in some other school?". "Yes" responses were assigned a 
value of 1, and "no" responses were assigned a O value. 
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Children also used the "thumbs up/thumbs down" drawing to 
facilitate their responses. 
d) Evaluation of Deserved Punishment, or a measurement of 
how much punishment an actor should be given for a particular 
transgression. To measure this, participants were asked, 
"Should the teacher punish (the actor) for __ (the 
transgression)?", and if so, "How much, a little, or a lot." 
Responses were scored on a three-point scale where an answer 
of "no"= 0, "a little"= 1, and "a lot"= 2. Children were 
shown a drawing depicting a little circle and a big circle to 
indicate "a little" or "a lot". 
e) Negation of Rule by Authority, or whether a teacher 
could legitimately dispose of a particular rule and whether 
this would be wrong. · To measure this, participants were 
asked, "Would it be okay to (the transgression) if 
the teacher let kids do this?". "Yes" responses were 
assigned a value of l, and "no" responses were assigned a 0 
value. Children also used the "thumbs up/thumbs down" 
drawing to facilitate their responses. 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
A LI!ffLB 
BI'l! BAD 
0 
LI'.1!1'LZ 
n:s 
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Figure 2. (A) "Four ,Faces" scale used to measure Seriousness 
of Transgression, (B) Rating scale used to measure Deserved 
Punishment, and (C) Rating scale used to measure Rule 
Contingency, Rule Relativity, and Rule Negation. 
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Measures Completed by Parents 
Parents of the children were asked to fill out the 
consent form (See Appendix Band C), and a demographics 
questionnaire which included an assessment of their child's 
day care experience, the number of siblings the child has, 
and other social contacts. In addition, the Injury Behavior 
Checklist (IBC) (Speltz, Gonzales, Sulzbacher, & Quan, 1990), 
and an assessment of the frequency of injuries experienced by 
their child was given (See Appendix D and E). 
Procedure 
The 120 preschool children were individually interviewed 
by an adult experimenter in a separate classroom for 
approximately 15 to 25 minutes. They were generally seated 
across from the experimenter either by a little table or on 
the floor with the experimenter. In addition, 24 (20%) of 
the participants were reinterviewed 2 to 4 weeks later to 
assess the reliability of the measures. Six children per age 
group were reinterviewed. Only children who still 
corresponded to their originally assigned age group after the 
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2 to 4 week period were reinterviewed. 
The experimenter initially gained rapport with the 
children in a particular classroom by visiting beforehand and 
assisting the teacher with-snack time or other activities. 
The teachers also introduced the experimenter and announced 
that the experimenter would be playing some story games about 
rules with them. Individual participants were then asked 
"Would you like to play a story game with me?" before 
proceeding to a separate classroom. Children were first 
instructed in the use of the "thumbs up/thumbs down" drawing, 
the "a little/a lot" drawing, and "four-faces" scale. After 
a participant had gained an understanding of this measure and 
correctly identified the meaning of each face, they proceeded 
with the experimental session. 
Participants were told that they were going to look at 
some stories about rules and then asked to tell the 
experimenter some examples of rules they have in their 
school. If a child did not understand what a rule was, it 
was explained. Participants were shown each of the eight 
stimulus drawings with their corresponding story line in 
random order" After each story, they were asked the above-
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mentioned questions. If a child did not understand a rule or 
what was happening in the drawing, an explanation was given. 
Responses were recorded on answer sheets. Participants were 
subsequently debriefed about the importance of following the 
rules, keeping safe, and going to an adult if they are unsure 
about a particular situation. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
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The analyses were run using the SYSTAT statistical package 
(Wilkinson, 1989). Significance levels were set at .05. 
Hypotheses #1, #2 and #3 were tested by subjecting the data of 
each of the five dependent variables (i.e. seriousness of 
transgression, deserved punishment, rule contingency, rule 
relativity, and rule negation) to a 4(Age) X 2(Gender) X 
2(Domain) X 2(0utcome) repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with age and gender as between-group factors and 
domain and outcome as within-group factors. Tukey honestly 
significant difference (HSD) post-hoc multiple comparison 
tests of mean differences were performed to clarify 
significant interaction effects obtained from the ANOVAS. 
Hypothesis 1 
It was first hypothesized that moral rules would be 
distinguished from safety rules throughout the participants 
tested as evidenced by significant main effects of domain for 
each of the dependent variables. Table 1 presents the means 
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for each dependent variable according to domain. Only on the 
seriousness of transgression variable was a main effect of 
domain obtained, F(l, 112) = 6.78, p < .01. This effect 
indicates that violations of prudential rules were rated more 
serious (M = 3.12) than moral rule transgressions (M = 2.91). 
There were no significant domain main effects on measures of 
deserved punishment, F(l, 112) = 0.25, p > .05; rule 
contingency, F(l, 112) = 2.32, p > .05; rule relativity, 
F(l, 112) = .23, p > .05; or rule negation, F(l, 112) = 
2.54, p > .05 (See Table 1 below). 
Table 1 
Mean Ratings on the Moral and Prudential Domains for Each 
Dependent Variable (DV) 
DV 
Seriousness 
Punishment 
Contingency 
Relativity 
Negation 
Moral 
2.91** 
1.54 
0.40 
0.24 
0.49 
Domain 
Prudential 
3.12** 
1. 55 
0.37 
0.23 
0.45 
Note. Ratings of Seriousness were 0= Not bad, 1= Okay, 2= A 
Little bit bad, 3= Very bad, and 4= Very very bad. Punishment 
ratings were O= None, 1= A little, and 2= A lot. Ratings of 
the remaining DV were 0= No, 1= Yes. Data were subjected to 
4 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAs. A domain main effect was obtained on 
the Seriousness variable. 
**p < . 01. 
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In addition to the domain main effect on the Seriousness 
variable, there were significant Domain X Outcome interactions 
for all dependent variables: Seriousness of transgression, 
F(l, 112) = 23.28, p < .001; deserved punishment, F(l, 112) 
= 22.84, p < .001; rule contingency, F(l, 112) = 7.10, p < 
.01; rule relativity, F(l, 112) = 8.37, p < .01; and rule 
negation, F(l, 112) = 9.75, p < .01. The significant Domain 
X Outcome interactions indicate that differences between moral 
and prudential mean ratings were not constant across type of 
outcome (negative vs. neutral). In other words, children 
perceived differences in how they viewed the moral vs. the 
prudential domains, but this is evident only when the effects 
of outcome are taken into consideration. The patterns 
revealed in the Domain X Outcome interactions for each 
dependent variable are presented in Figure 3. Each graph 
illustrates a pattern of more differentiation of ratings 
between negative and neutral outcomes for the moral domain 
than for the prudential domain (See Figure 3 on page 62). 
Analysis of these interactions with Tukey HSD multiple 
comparison tests further confirms the differentiation of 
domains by comparing means within-domains and between-domains. 
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Figure 3. Patterns revealed in the Domain X Outcome 
interactions for each dependent variable. There was 
differentiation of ratings between negative and neutral 
outcomes for the moral domain, but not for the prudential 
domain. 
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The within-domains results are presented first. Table 2 
presents the within-domain means for negative vs. neutral 
outcomes for each dependent variable. Differences between 
means were significant for the moral domain for all dependent 
variables except relativity. However, there were no 
significant mean differences for the prudential domain (See 
Table 2 below) . 
Table 2 
Means for Within-Domain Differences in Negative vs. Neutral 
Outcomes for Each Dependent Variable (DV) 
Domain 
Moral Prudential 
Outcome Outcome 
DV Negative Neutral Negative Neutral 
Seriousness 3.50*** 2.32*** 3.30 2.95 
Punishment 1.67** 1.42** 1.51 1. 58 
Contingency .30** .50** .33 .40 
Relativity .18 .29 .22 .23 
Negation .38*** .59*** .41 .49 
Note. Means were subjected to a Tukey HSD multiple 
comparison test. 
**p < .01, ***p < .001 
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As evidenced by the significant differences between means 
in the moral domain, outcome made a greater difference to 
children when asked to judge moral transgressions as opposed 
to prudential transgressions. Children were more likely to 
judge moral transgressions as more serious when a negative 
outcome resulted (M = 3.50) than when a neutral outcome 
resulted (M = 2.32). However, outcome did not affect 
children's judgments of prudential rules, as evidenced by rto 
within-prudential-domain differences. 
On measures of deserved punishment, moral transgressions 
resulting in a negative outcome were rated as deserving more 
punishment (M = 1.67) than those resulting in a neutral 
outcome (M = 1.42). However, prudential transgressions 
resulting in a negative (M = 1.58) or neutral outcome (M = 
1.55) were rated as deserving the same amount of punishment. 
Outcome was not a factor in determining punishment for 
prudential transgressions. 
On measures of rule contingency, children were more 
likely to judge moral transgressions as okay to do in the 
absence of a rule when a neutral outcome resulted (M = .50) 
than when a negative outcome resulted (M = .30). However, 
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outcome was not a factor in determining whether a prudential 
transgression was okay to do in the absence of a rule. 
On measures of rule relativity, moral transgressions 
resulting in a neutral outcome were equally likely to be 
rated as okay to break in another school (M = .29) than 
those resulting in a negative outcome (M = .18). Similarly, 
prudential transgressions resulting in a negative (M = .22) 
or neutral outcome (M = .23) were rated the same. 
Finally, on measures of rule negation, children were more 
likely to judge moral transgressions as okay to do if the 
teacher permits it when a neutral outcome resulted (M = .59) 
than when a negative outcome resulted (M = .38). These 
differences were not obtained for the prudential domain (See 
Table 2 on page 63). 
Between-domain differences were only obtained on the 
seriousness, contingency, and negation measures. 
Moral/negative violations were judged more serious than 
prudential/neutral violations (p < .001), but moral/neutral 
violations were judged less serious than both 
prudential/negative (p < .001) and prudential/neutral (p < 
.001) violations. On the contingency measure, the only 
significant between-domain comparison (p < .05) was the 
moral/neutral with the prudential/negative comparison. The 
same was true for the negation variable. 
Hypothesis 2 
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Secondly, it was hypothesized that differences in 
children's judgments of moral and prudential rules would be 
smaller in younger children. The younger preschool children 
were expected to differentiate less between safety and moral 
rules compared to older preschool children, possibly judging 
characteristics of the two domains as equal. Support for 
this hypothesis would be a significant Age X Domain 
interaction. However, no interactions of this type were 
found on any of the dependent variables (All F's> 2.1 and 
p's >.10). However, significant Age X Domain X Outcome 
interactions were found for three of the dependent variables: 
Seriousness of transgression, F(3, 112) = 3.20, p < .05, 
deserved punishment, F(3, 112) = 4.05, p < .01, and rule 
contingency, F(3, 112) = 2.92, p < .05. For each of these 
three dependent variables, results indicate that the pattern 
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observed for the Domain X Outcome interaction varies 
depending on the age of the child. Figure 4 presents the 
graphs of the Age X Domain X Outcome interaction for the 
seriousness variable. These graphs reveal a pattern of 
increased differentiation with age for the moral domain, but 
not for the prudential domain (See Figure 4 on page 68). 
Figure 5 presents the graphs of the Age X Domain X Outcome 
interaction for the punishment variable. These graphs 
demonstrate that the younger children attributed the same 
amount of punishment to moral and prudential transgressions 
resulting in a negative outcome as those resulting in a 
neutral outcome. However, 6 year-olds attributed more 
punishment to moral transgressions resulting in a negative 
outcome, but they still attributed the same amount of 
punishment regardless of outcome to prudential transgressions 
(See Figure 5 on page 69). Figure 6 presents the graphs of 
the Age X Domain X Outcome interaction for the contingency 
variable. These graphs indicate no differentiation on 
ratings between negative and neutral outcomes for either 
domains, except for ratings given by the 6 year-olds (See 
Figure 6 on page 70). 
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differentiation of ratings between negative and neutral 
outcomes for the moral domain and these differences increased 
with age, but for the prudential domain, no significant 
differences were obtained for any age. 
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Analysis of these 3-way interactions with Tukey HSD 
multiple comparison tests provided additional information 
regarding age differences in the patterns previously 
described under Hypothesis #1. Table 3 presents the within-
age means descriptive of the significant 3-way interactions 
for the seriousness, punishment, and contingency measures 
(See Table 3 on page 73). As seen earlier for the 
seriousness measure, there was differentiation of ratings 
between negative and neutral outcomes for the moral domain 
and these differences increased with age, but for the 
prudential domain, no significant differences were obtained. 
Between-domain differences were not obtained for the 3 year-
olds, but for the 4, 5, and 6 year-olds, results indicated 
that they rated moral/neutral violations as less serious than 
prudential/negative or prudential/neutral violations (p < 
.05 top< .001). 
On the punishment measure, 3, 4, and 5 year-olds 
attributed the same amount of punishment to moral 
transgressions resulting in a negative outcome as those 
resulting in a neutral outcome. The same pattern was 
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obtained for prudential transgressions. However, 6 year-olds 
attributed more punishment to moral transgressions resulting 
in a negative outcome, but they still attributed the same 
amount of punishment regardless of outcome to prudential 
transgressions. Between-domain differences on the punishment 
measure were only obtained for the 5 and 6 year-olds. The 3 
and 4 year-olds did not differentiate between-domains. The 5 
year-olds assigned more punishment to moral/negative 
violations than to prudential/negative violations (p < .05). 
The 6 year-olds assigned more punishment to 
prudential/negative (p < .025) and prudential/neutral (p < 
.005) violations than to moral/neutral violations. 
On the rule contingency measure, no differentiation was 
obtained on ratings between negative and neutral outcomes for 
the moral domain and for the prudential domains, as described 
previously, except for the 6 year-olds, who diffentiated 
between negative and neutral outcomes in the moral domain. 
The 6 year-olds were also the only age group to obtain 
between-domain differences. They viewed moral/neutral 
violations as more contingent on the presence of a rule than 
prudential/negative violations. 
Table 3 
Means for Within Age Differences in Negative vs. Neutral 
Outcomes 
Domain 
Moral 
Outcome 
DV Negative Neutral 
Seriousness 
Age 3 2.97* 2.13* 
Age 4 3.72*** 2.78*** 
Age 5 3.63*** 2.32*** 
Age 6 3.67*** 2.05*** 
Punishment 
Age 3 1. 33 1. 28 
Age 4 1. 68 1. 55 
Age 5 1. 80 1. 50 
Age 6 1.85*** 1.33*** 
Contingency 
Age 3 .48 .68 
Age 4 .15 .28 
Age 5 .38 .48 
Age 6 .20** .55** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Prudential 
Outcome 
Negative 
2.87 
3.77 
3.25 
3.30 
1. 35 
1. 58 
1.45 
1. 67 
.60 
.17 
.30 
.25 
Neutral 
2.42 
3.08 
3.07 
3.22 
1. 38 
1.55 
1. 63 
1. 77 
.53 
.22 
.48 
.37 
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Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis predicted that transgressions of 
both moral and safety rules that result in negative outcomes 
would be judged more harshly than transgressions with no 
negative outcome. However, it was also speculated that 
children may not judge safety rule violations resulting in 
injury as deserving of punishment. A main effect of outcome 
would confirm the hypothesis that overall negative outcomes 
would be judged more harshly regardless of domain. Results 
indicated strong main effects of outcome for all the 
dependent variables: Seriousness of transgression, F(l, 
112) = 66.19, p < .001, deserved punishment, F(l, 112) = 
4.72, p < .05, rule contingency, F(l, 112) = 34.75, p < 
.001, rule relativity, F(l, 112) = 14.40, p < .001, and 
rule negation, F(l, 112) = 29.81, p < .001. Table 4 
presents the mean ratings on negative and neutral outcomes 
for each dependent variable. The outcome main effects were 
also qualified by the Domain X Outcome and the Age X Domain X 
Outcome interactions previously described. As noted before 
when discussing the first two hypotheses, there were 
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diffences in how children rated negative vs. neutral outcomes 
for the moral stories compared to the prudential stories (See 
Table 4 below) . 
Table 4 
Mean Ratings on Negative and Neutral Outcomes for Each 
Dependent Variable 
DV 
Seriousness 
Punishment 
Contingency 
Relativity 
Negation 
*p < .05, ***p < .001. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 
Negative 
3.40*** 
1. 59* 
0.32*** 
0.20*** 
0.40*** 
Outcome 
2.63*** 
1. 50* 
0.45*** 
0.26*** 
0.54*** 
Neutral 
The fourth hypothesis was that individual differences 1n 
day care experience would be correlated with children's 
judgments of moral rules. In addition, number of siblings 
was also speculated to influence children's distinctions 
between moral and safety rules. The fifth hypothesis was 
that individual differences in the number of injuries a child 
has experienced and/or injury behavior frequency would be 
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correlated with more extreme safety rule judgments. In order 
to examine individual differences in children's judgements of 
moral and safety rule transgressions, Pearson partial 
correlations were conducted on the social interaction 
measures and the injury and injury behavior measures, 
controlling for age. 
Social interaction measurements were obtained from the 
parental questionnaires. These measures were the number of 
hours of neighborhood play, hours spent in day care per day, 
total number of siblings, and a total amount of time spent in 
day care throughout the child's life. These measures were 
correlated with total moral score for the seriousness measure 
and total moral score for the punishment measure. No 
significant correlations were found for any of the age groups. 
Measures of injury and injury behavior were obtained from 
the total score of the Injury Behavior Checklist and a total 
number of injuries sustained score. These measures were 
correlated with total prudential score for the seriousness 
measure and total prudential score for the punishment 
measure. No significant correlations were found for any of 
the age groups. 
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Reliability 
Test-retest reliability was obtained 2 to 4 weeks after 
the initial interview for 24 (20%) of the participants (Six 
participants per age group). Similar to procedures utilized 
by Smetana (1981a), correlation coefficients were computed on 
means of summed moral items and summed prudential items to 
increase the range of variance. Table 5 presents the Pearson 
correlation coefficients obtained for moral and prudential 
measures for each dependent variable. Smetana (1981a) 
obtained a correlation coefficient of .66, p < .01 for 
conventional items and interpreted this finding as indicative 
of adequate reliability. In addition, Wilkinson (1989) 
reported that a coefficient of .466 represents a moderate 
correlation. Correlation coefficients in the present study 
ranged from .48 to .89. In addition, all correlations were 
significant at the .05 level or higher (See Table 5 on page 
78). Therefore, these findings were interpreted as 
indicating acceptable reliability for the measures utilized 
in the present study. 
Table 5 
Test-retest Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Moral 
and Prudential Scores on Each Dependent Variable (DV) 
(n = 24) 
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DV Moral Prudential 
Seriousness .59** .58** 
Punishment .48* .59** 
Contingency .82*** .89*** 
Relativity .68*** .76*** 
Negation .78*** .81*** 
*p < .05, **p < .01., ***p < .001. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
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The focus of this study was the exploration of children's 
safety judgments through a cognitive-developmental 
perspective. The purpose of the study was two-fold. The 
first goal was to determine if preschool children 
distinguish between moral and safety rule concepts. 
Specifically, this study investigated if younger preschool 
children had more difficulty than older preschool children 
distinguishing moral and safety rules. Similarly, this study 
investigated how negative or neutral consequences of rule 
violations might impact children's judgments of the two rule 
domains. The second goal of the study was to investigate 
experiential factors that may contribute to the development 
of children's moral and safety rule concepts. Specifically, 
this study investigated whether children's experience with 
social interactions was related to moral rule judgments, and 
whether children's experience with injury was related to 
safety rule judgments. 
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First Goal of the Study: Do Children Distinguish Between 
Moral and Safety Rule Concepts 
Previous research (e.g., Smetana, 1981a; Tisak & Turiel, 
1984) has shown that the following five criterion judgments 
can reliably be used as measures in distinguishing different 
rule domains: Seriousness of transgression, amount of 
deserved punishment, rule contingency, rule relativity, and 
negation of rule by authority. All of these criteria were 
used in the present study. Three hypotheses addressed the 
first goal of this study: 
The first hypothesis predicted that moral rules would be 
distinguished from safety rules throughout the participants 
tested as evidenced by significant main effects of domain for 
each of the dependent variables. This has generally been the 
accepted manner of determining domain differences. In a 
strict sense, the first hypothesis was not verified according 
to the standards of previous studies because a main effect of 
domain was only found on the seriousness of transgression 
measure. 
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The second hypothesis predicted that younger preschool 
children would differentiate less between safety and moral 
rules compared to older preschool children, possibly judging 
characteristics of the two domains as equal. Support for 
this hypothesis would be significant Age X Domain 
interactions for each of the dependent variables. However, 
no interactions of this type were found on any of the 
dependent variables. According to this standard, the second 
hypothesis was not confirmed. 
The third hypothesis predicted that transgressions of 
both moral and safety rules which result in negative 
outcomes would be judged more serious than transgressions 
with no negative outcome, as evidenced by main effects of 
outcome on all the dependent variables. Results indicated 
main effects of outcome for all the dependent variables, 
confirming the third hypothesis. However, upon further 
analysis of the Domain X Outcome and the Age X Domain X 
Outcome interactions, results revealed that outcome only had 
an impact on moral judgments and not on prudential 
judgments. This was evidenced by significant mean 
differences in the moral/negative vs. moral/neutral ratings, 
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but no significant differences were found in the 
prudential/negative vs. prudential/neutral ratings. Thus, it 
can not be concluded that children judged both moral and 
prudential rule violations which resulted in negative 
outcomes as more serious than those which resulted in neutral 
outcomes because prudential rules were judged equally 
serious, regardless of outcome. Analysis of the interactions 
not only altered the interpretation of the third hypothesis, 
but also the interpretation of the first and second 
hypotheses. 
Even though the first two hypothesis were discomfirmed 
according to the strict predictions made, the Domain X 
Outcome and the Age X Domain X Outcome interactions offer 
additional important information necessary for interpreting 
the results accurately. Once these interactions were 
explored in depth, results indicated that the first two 
hypotheses were indeed confirmed. 
Fist, the patterns revealed in the Domain X Outcome 
interaction revealed differences in domains because it was 
clear that children did not judge moral rules in the same 
manner as prudential rules when outcome was taken into 
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consideration. Outcome affected children's judgments of 
safety rules, but outcome did not affect children's judgments 
of prudential rules. This is observed not only in the graphs 
presented, but also when mean differences are analyzed. 
Thus, the results demonstrate that children differentiated 
between domains, confirming the first hypothesis. 
Secondly, the Age X Domain X Outcome interaction revealed 
the same pattern just discussed (outcome had an impact for 
moral judgments, but not for prudential judgments), but this 
interaction also revealed that younger children perceived 
less differences between the domains when outcome was taken 
into consideration, confirming the second hypothesis. Other 
results provided additional support to the first two 
hypotheses. For example, the domain main effect on the 
seriousness measure indicated that prudential rules were 
judged more important (i.e. violations of the rule were seen 
as more serious) than moral rules. Safety issues appear to 
be more salient in the minds of preschoolers because safety 
rules are judged more important. These findings also support 
the conclusion that children distinguish between safety rules 
and moral rules. 
As discussed earlier, previous research has primarily 
determined differences in domain by using main effects and 
has not included variables to produce complex interactions. 
The design of the present study made it possible to get 
complex effects because additional factors (e.g., negative 
and neutral outcomes) were included. One study which did 
include negative and neutral outcomes in their stories of 
moral and prudential rule transgressions was the study by 
Tisak and Turiel (1984). 
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In comparing the variables that were used both in the 
Tisak & Turiel (1984) study and the present study, Tisak & 
Turiel (1984) found significant domain (moral vs. prudential) 
main effects on their variables measuring rule contingency, 
rule relativity, and negation of rule by authority. 
Specifically, when comparing moral vs. prudential rules, they 
found that children were more likely to say that a prudential 
transgression was okay in the absence of a rule, more likely 
to say that prudential rules were less generalizable, and 
less likely to object to having the prudential rules changed 
by authority. However, they concluded that only a minority 
of participants judged prudential rules differently from 
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moral rules. By contrast, results in the present study did 
not find main effects for rule contingency, rule relativity, 
or negation of rule by authority. However, when comparisons 
were made after separating domains further by outcome, 
differences were found. Specifically, preschool children 
judged moral rule violations which resulted in a neutral 
outcome as more contingent on the presence of a rule, and 
more okay for authority to dispense of the rule, than 
prudential rule violations which resulted in a negative 
outcome. Tisak and Turiel (1984) also assessed the 
importance attributed to moral and prudential rules, which 
was equivalent to the present study's measure of seriousness 
of transgression. Three important results were discussed 
with regard to judgments of seriousness: 
First, Tisak and Turiel (1984) found no significant main 
effect differences when comparing the two moral rule 
transgressions (stealing and pushing) even though the 
"pushing" transgression resulted in an injury. They did find 
that the younger participants in their study (6 year-olds) 
judged the "pushing" violation more harshly because it caused 
physical harm. The older subjects (8 and 10 year-olds) 
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judged the two moral rules equally because both pertained to 
welfare. However, results from the present study indicated 
that moral rule violations resulting in injury were judged 
significantly more harshly than moral rule violations which 
did not result in harm. 
Secondly, Tisak and Turiel (1984) found that the majority 
of children (52%) judged the stealing rule violation 
(moral/neutral) as more wrong than the running in the rain 
and getting a cut on the knee (prudential/negative) rule 
violation. However, results from the present study indicate 
that preschoolers reversed their judgments of seriousness. 
They judged prudential/negative as significantly more serious 
than moral/neutral violations. They also judged 
prudential/neutral violations as more serious than 
moral/neutral violations, indicating that prudential rules 
are of high priority to preschool children. 
Thirdly, the majority (63%) of 6 year old children in the 
Tisak and Turiel (1984) study judged moral/negative 
violations to be more wrong than prudential/negative 
violations, but the present study indicated that these two 
types of rule violations were judged equally serious. Again, 
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even though previous studies have found the moral rule 
transgressions to be the most serious types of violations, 
the participants in the present study judged prudential rule 
transgressions to be equally serious when both types of rules 
result in a negative outcome. However, if both result in a 
neutral outcome, the prudential rule violations were judged 
more serious. This same pattern was observed for 4, 5, and 6 
year old children in the present study, but the 3 year old 
children did not show these differences in judgments between-
domains. The 3 year-olds rated moral and prudential rules 
equally serious regardless of outcome. This supports the 
second hypothesis which predicted that younger children would 
have more difficulty distinguishing between-domains. 
Similarly, the Age X Domain X Outcome interaction for the 
Punishment measure revealed that 3 and 4 year-olds did not 
assign different punishment between-domains or within-
domains. The 5 year-olds did not differ within-domain, but 
they did assign significantly more punishment to 
moral/negative rule violations than to prudential/negative 
rule violations. The 6 year-olds differed significantly 
within the moral domain, assigning more punishment to 
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moral/negative than to moral/neutral. However, the 6 year-
olds did not differ within prudential domain, assigning the 
same amount of punishment regardless of outcome. Differences 
were also found between-domains for the 6 year-olds, 
assigning more punishment to prudential/neutral than to 
moral/neutral, and more punishment to prudential/negative 
than to moral/neutral. For the contingency variable, there 
were no within-domain or between-domain differences for the 
3, 4, and 5 year old children, but the 6 year old children 
differed within-moral-domain and between-domains. Overall, 
children of different ages demonstrated different patterns in 
judging moral and prudential rule violations. Younger 
children differentiated less, as evidenced by less within-
domain and between-domain differences found. 
Possible interpretations of these results are that safety 
is very salient in the lives of preschoolers, particularly 
younger preschoolers, regardless of whether a negative 
outcome results from a safety rule transgression. Turiel 
(1977) reported that different interactions with the 
environment will result in the formation of the distinct rule 
domains, and that experiences that stimulate development in 
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one domain are different from those that stimulate 
development in another domain. It is possible that the 
developing child encounters safety issues before moral 
issues, and first develops an understanding of the prudential 
domain through interactions with both the physical 
environment and social environment. This interpretation is 
consistent with research on children's conceptions of moral 
vs. social-conventional rules, for which correspondingly 
different socialization patterns have been documented (Nucci 
& Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana; 1984, 
Smetana 1989; Turiel 1977). 
Perhaps preschool children have been socialized by their 
parents to view safety rules as very important. For example, 
it is possible that parents and teachers react in an 
exaggerated fashion to a potential safety rule violation 
(e.g., when the child is about to run in front of a car), 
even though no injury ultimately results. This response from 
adults may facilitate the child's learning that safety rules 
are very important. Therefore, the findings of this study 
possibly reflect the frequency of socialization feedback from 
parents and teachers about safety behaviors. Previous 
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research indicates that social interactions strengthen the 
development of rule domains (Turiel, 1977). 
Future research is indicated to investigate factors which 
account for the eventual change in moral vs. safety rule 
priorities reported to occur in older children (Tisak & 
Turiel~ 1984). This change in priority may be due to the 
amount of socialization regarding safety rules vs. the amount 
of socialization regarding moral rules. Perhaps older 
children are less exposed to potential safety rule violations 
because their cognitive and motor abilities have improved and 
they no longer rely primarily on their parents to keep them 
safe. In addition, social interactions and moral issues may 
become more salient to older children as they become more 
involved in peer relationships. 
Another possible interpretation of the results is that 
children may learn safety and moral behavior by modeling 
their parent's reactions to transgressions. Parents may not 
respond seriously to moral transgressions which result in a 
neutral outcome. For example, the data demonstrated that 
children viewed moral transgressions resulting in a neutral 
outcome as less serious and deserving less punishment than 
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moral transgressions resulting in a negative outcome. 
Parents may view instances of moral/neutral transgressions as 
"no harm done, so it is not wrong" even though a moral rule 
was violated. Subsequently, young children may learn that it 
is not serious to violate a moral rule if no negative outcome 
results. 
The first goal of the study was accomplished. Results 
revealed that preschool children were able to differentiate 
between safety and moral rules and that negative outcomes do 
not affect prudential judgments but do affect moral 
judgments. These differences are speculated to correspond to 
socialization patterns in early childhood, with safety rule 
socialization being of high priority for preschool children. 
Second Goal of the Study: Investigate Experiential 
Factors that Contribute to the Development of Children's 
Moral and Safety Rule Concepts 
The second goal of this study was to gain knowledge on 
possible origins of moral and safety concepts. Specifically, 
this study investigated whether children's experience with 
social interactions was related to moral rule judgments, and 
whether children's experience with injury was related to 
safety rule judgments. The fourth and fifth hypotheses 
addressed this goal. 
The fourth hypothesis predicted that individual 
differences in day care experience would be correlated with 
children's judgments of moral rules. The fifth hypothesis 
predicted that individual differences in the number of 
injuries a child has experienced and/or injury behavior 
frequency would be correlated with more extreme safety rule 
judgments. However, no correlations were found between 
amount of social interaction and judgments of moral rules. 
Similarly, no correlations were found between injury 
experience and judgments of safety rules. 
One interpretation for these null findings may be that 
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the measures used to measure social interaction were invalid. 
Since no previous research had addressed individual 
differences in prudential judgments, standardized measures 
were not available. In addition, it was predicted that at 
least in the moral domain, a correlation between the moral 
and the social interaction measures would be obtained because 
previous research (Nucci & Nucci, 1982a, 1982b; Nucci & 
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Turiel, 1978; Smetana; 1984, Smetana 1989; Turiel 1977) had 
demonstrated that social interaction contributes to the 
development of moral concepts. 
Another interpretation of the null findings might be that 
there was no significant variability in the types of social 
interactions experienced by the participants. If the second 
goal of the study was to investigate individual differences, 
but individual differences were not obtained in the data, 
then correlations could not be substantiated. Future 
research might address this problem by obtaining more 
detailed measurements on the types of social interactions a 
particular child experiences. For example, children could be 
divided into groups descriptive of children who tend to be 
highly social in day care vs. children who are relatively 
isolated and withdrawn at day care, and then assess their 
development of moral concepts. 
With regard to prudential items, lack of variability also 
appeared to be a significant problem. For example, the mean 
score for nwnber of serious injures reported during the 
child's lifetime was 1.8, with the majority of parents 
reporting no injuries. Again, since individual differences 
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were not found on this measure, significant correlations 
could not be obtained. Variability was obtained on the 
Injury Behavior Checklist (scores ranged from 6 to 54, with a 
mean of 26), which measures injury related behavior. Results 
may indicate that injury related behavior is simply not 
correlated to injury related concepts. Children might be 
behaving differently, but their behavior does not necessarily 
lead to differences in their concepts of safety. This is 
consistent with previous research on adults which has 
demonstrated that experiencing injuries may sensitize one to 
dangerous situations, or may desensitize one to dangerous 
situations, especially if a safety rule violation is followed 
by no injury (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993). Overall, the 
results did not provide enough information to accomplish the 
second goal of the study. 
Perhaps the second goal could have been addressed more 
clearly if children had also been asked to provide statements 
of why they thought a particular rule violation was wrong 
(obtaining justification categories). This has been done in 
other studies (Smetana, 1985; and Smetana, Bridgeman, & 
Turiel, 1983) successfully with preschool children. For 
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example, Smetana (1985) demonstrated that children (ages 3 to 
6) were able to state the reasons why they thought a 
particular rule violation was wrong. The children's 
responses were categorized as pertaining to other's welfare, 
unjust act, rule or authority prohibits act, act creates 
disorder, etc. Responses obtained from children's 
justification categories would provide information on how 
children reason about moral and safety rules, which would 
provide an indication of possible origins of rule concepts. 
The use of justification categories would also define the 
content of each domain more clearly. 
Implications 
Knowledge obtained from this study can possibly serve as 
a guide to understand better how children form the concept of 
safety and how they learn from and process the experiences 
they encounter when safety rules are violated. A significant 
finding in this study was how the impact of negative vs. 
neutral outcomes of rule transgressions influenced children's 
judgments of safety and moral rules. The results indicated 
that consequences were a factor in judging moral rules, but 
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consequences were not a factor in judging prudential rules. 
Knowing more about how children perceive consequences can 
aid in developing intervention programs. For example, 
perhaps parents and teachers could teach preschool children 
the importance of following moral rules by reacting even when 
a moral rule violation results in a neutral outcome. It 
would also be important to explore why safety becomes less 
important as children grow older. Given the significant age 
differences found in this study, perhaps knowledge obtained 
in this study can be implemented in developing intervention 
programs which match the developmental level of preschool 
children and aid in preventing injury. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of the study was two-fold. The first goal 
was to determine if preschool children distinguish between 
moral and safety rule concepts. Specifically, this study 
investigated if younger preschool children had more 
difficulty than older preschool children distinguishing moral 
and safety rules. Similarly, this study investigated how 
negative or neutral consequences of rule violations might 
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impact children's judgments of the two rule domains. The 
first goal of this study was accomplished. Substantial 
evidence obtained from significant interactions demonstrated 
that children distinguished between the moral and safety 
domains. Children also judged prudential rule violations as 
more serious than moral rule violations. In addition, the 
interactions revealed that younger preschool children 
differentiated less between domains. Another major finding 
was that preschool children appear to use the consequences 
when judging moral rules, but consequence do not appear to 
affect children's judgments of prudential rules. Prudential 
rules were still judged serious and deserving of punishment 
whether a negative outcome resulted or not. 
The second goal of the study was to investigate 
experiential factors that may contribute to the development 
of children's moral and safety rule concepts. Specifically, 
this study investigated whether children's experience with 
social interactions was related to moral rule judgments, and 
whether children's experience with injury was related to 
safety rule judgments. This second goal was not 
accomplished. Difficulties with the measures and lack of 
variability in the data were interpreted as possible 
explanations for the lack of correlations found. 
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Results of this study are speculated to correspond to 
socialization patterns in early childhood, with safety rule 
socialization being of high priority for preschool children. 
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Appendix A: Stories Presented to Participants 
Moral Stories: 
( 1) The kids are at recess. In this school there is a rule that says "No pushing". 
But Susie came along and broke the rule. She pushed Mary. 
Mary gets a cut on her knee. 
(2) The kids are at recess. In this school there is a rule that says "No throwing rocks". 
But Mike broke the rule. He picked up a rock and threw it at Jim. 
The rock hit Jim on the head. He got a cut on his head. 
(3) Here the kids are eating snack together. In this school there is a rule that says "No 
stealing". 
But Emma broke the rule. She stole Amy's apple. 
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Emma runs off with Amy's apple, but Amy didn't mind. She didn't want it anyway. 
( 4) These kids are ready to go swimming. In this school there is a rule that says "Don't 
spray people with water". 
But Steve broke the rule. He sprayed Frank with water. 
But Frank didn't mind. He already had his bathing suit on. 
Safety Stories: 
(5) It starts to rain during recess. In this school there is a rule that says "No running in the 
rain". 
But Julie breaks the rule. She starts running in the rain. 
ulie slipped in a puddle and gets a cut on her knee. 
(6) The kids are outside at playtime. In this school there is a rule that says "Don't stand 
too close to the swing". 
But Danny broke the rule. He walked too close to the swing. 
Danny got hit and got a cut on his head. 
(7) In this school a man is working on the roof. There is a rule that says "No playing 
around the workman's ladder". 
But Helen broke the rule and started climbing the ladder. 
She then jumped off the ladder and ran back to the classroom. 
(8) In this school there is a kitchen. There is a rule that says "Don't touch the stove". 
But Sam broke the rule and turned on the stove. 
He turned it off and went back to the classroom. 
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Appendix B: Letter to Parent. 
Dear Parent: 
The __ day care center is participating in a research project conducted by Maria Ast, 
doctoral candidate, and Dr. Richard Potts from the Psychology Department at Oklahoma 
State University. The study concerns what young children think about safety rules. 
Surprisingly, very little is known about how children understand safety rules, although it is 
known that simple "safety" demonstrations are not very effective in improving children's 
safety behavior. Results of this project will hopefully lead to a better understanding of how 
children can learn safety rules. 
In this study, children will be interviewed individually at the day care by Ms. Ast for about 
15 to 20 minutes. They will be shown black and white drawings that tell stories about 
common safety rules (such as "Don't go near a hot stove"), as well as social rules (such as 
"Don't take anyone's snack"). They will be asked several questions about the different 
stories. The purpose is to see how children of different ages understand and judge 
different types of rules. At the end of the interview session, they will be given brief 
instructions about safety and the importance of following safety and social rules. We are 
also interested on what types of experiences might affect children's understanding of safety 
rules, so we are also asking you to complete a brief questionnaire about your child's 
behaviors at home, including any injuries he or she may have received. 
Children will be asked if they would like to participate, and will do so only if they choose. 
They can end the interview at any time for any reason. Our experience has shown that 
children find participation in these projects quite enjoyable. Children's interview 
statements and your questionnaire answers will be completely confidential and will be seen 
only by the researchers directly involved in the project. Results will be compiled in group 
statistical terms, and not on an individual basis. When the analyses are completed, we will 
be happy to report the findings of the study and their importance to our understanding of 
child development. We hope that you will let your child participate. If so, please complete 
the attached forms and return them to your child's day care teacher. You may keep this 
page for your own information. If you have any questions, please contact one of us at 
744-6027. You may also contact University Research Services, 001 Life Sciences East, 
OSU, Stillwater, OK 74078, telephone 744-5700. Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Maria Ast, M.S Richard Potts, Ph.D 
Psychology graduate student Assistant Professor of Psychology 
Appendix C: Consent Form. 
Please keep the first page for your own information. Return this page together with the 
attached questionnaire. 
(Print your child's first and last name) 
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has my permission to participate in the study concerning children's understanding of safety 
rules being conducted by Maria Ast, M.S. and Dr. Potts of OSU. 
(Your signature) (date) 
PLEASE FILL OUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES. THESE 
FORMS SHOULD TAKE ONLY 5 OR 10 MINUTES TO COMPLETE. ALL 
INFORMATION THAT YOU PROVIDE WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. PLACE 
THE COMPLETED FORMS IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED, SEAL, AND RETURN 
TO YOUR CHILD'S TEACHER. YOUR EFFORT IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. 
THANK YOU! 
If you would like us to send you a summary of the general results of the study, please 
indicate your mailing address below: 
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Appendix D: Injury Behavior Checklist. 
Dear Parent: Please provide the following information concerning behaviors your child may 
sometimes show. Be assured that all of the information that you provide will be confidential 
and seen only by the researchers involved in this study. 
Use the 0-1-2-3-4 scale to indicate how often your child may show the behaviors listed. 
Circle the appropriate number for each of the 24 items. 
not very some- pretty very 
at all seldom times often often 
I (1 or (about (once/ (more 
I 2 times once/ week) than 
I in all) month) I once/ 
I I I week) 
-- --
1. Runs out into the street 0 1 2 3 4 
2. Jumps off furniture or other structures 0 1 2 3 4 
3. Jumps down stairs 0 1 2 3 4 
4. Rides bike in unsafe areas 0 1 2 3 4 
5. Runs or bumps into things 0 1 2 3 4 
6. Falls down 0 1 2 3 4 
7. Plays with fire 0 1 2 3 4 
8. Puts fingers or objects near appliances or 
outlets 0 1 2 3 4 
9. Leaves the house without permission 0 1 2 3 4 
10. Refuses to use car seat (or belt) or to stay 
seated in car 0 1 2 3 4 
11. Plays with sharp objects 0 1 2 3 4 
12. Pulls/pushes over furniture or heavy objects 0 1 2 3 4 
13. Falls out window or down stairs 0 1 2 3 4 
14. Puts objects or nonfood items in mouth 0 1 2 3 4 
15. Gets scratches, scrapes, bruises during play 0 1 2 3 4 
16. "Takes chances" on playground equipment 0 1 2 3 4 
17. Tries to climb on top of furniture or cabinets 0 1 2 3 4 
18. Stands on chairs 0 1 2 3 4 
19. Explores places that are off limits 0 1 2 3 4 
20. Gets into dangerous substances 0 1 2 3 4 
21. Plays carelessly or recklessly 0 1 2 3 4 
22. Comes into contact with hot objects 0 1 2 3 4 
23. Behaves carelessly in or around water hazards 0 1 2 3 4 
24. Teases and/or approaches unfamiliar animals 0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix E: Injury Questionnaire and Demographics. 
In this section, we are interested in the types of injuries that your child may have experienced. 
Please complete the chart below. Simply indicate which, if any, of the listed injuries your child 
has received, and if so, how many times it has occurred. 
type of injury number of times type of injury number of times 
broken bones 
muscle strain/sprain 
serious cut 
concussion 
bums (fire or chemical) 
animal bite/scratch 
poisoning 
water inhalation 
electric shock 
other (explain) 
Next, we would like for you to provide some information about your household which may also 
be relevant to children's judgments about safety. Please mark with an "X" where appropriate: 
Is yours a two-parent household? Yes __ No __ . 
What level of education did you complete?: 
some high school__ high school diploma__ some college__ college degree __ . 
If married, what level of education did your spouse complete?: 
some high school__ high school diploma__ some college__ college degree __ . 
What is your child's date of birth? Please write month, day, and year: I I 
How many younger brothers/sisters does your child have? __ _ Older ones? __ _ 
How many days in a typical week does your child play with other children in the 
neighborhood? __ _ 
Information about daycare/preschool: 
How old was your child when he or she started attending day care? (Please mark an "X" at the 
correct point on the time line below): 
, , I I' I I' I I' I 1, f, I' I' I J 1, 1,), I I I ' I I I I I' I I I I I'' I I I I,, I I I I 'II' I I· I I I' I' I I I I I 
0~ 6 =s 1~ 2~ 3~ 4~ 5~ 6~ 
Has your child stayed out of day care for an extended length of time and then returned?: 
Yes__ No __ . If yes, for how long was your child out of day care? __ _ 
How many days per week is your child in day care? ___ . How many hours per day? __ . 
Thank you sincerely for providing this information. 
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